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Introduction 
 
In addition to the past endeavour to meet the MDGs, the Ethiopian government launched 
an ambitious program, ‘Growth and Transformative Plan (2011-2015)’ in 2011 to 
transform the country’s economic growth and development. As core part of the Plan, the 
economic and infrastructure sections envisage massive investment and infrastructure 
development. While the ultimate target is to improve socio-economic conditions and 
fulfil basis needs, the Plan will likely heighten massive eviction of people from their 
ancestral lands and thousands from their houses, and deprive many more of the traditional 
means of livelihood. In both the past as well as the present development endeavour, little 
attention has been given to a human rights-approach to development. The discourse on 
economic growth and development tends to focus more on mere economic improvement, 
implying needs-based approach. This will reinforce the notion that the fulfilment of 
economic, social and cultural rights is an aspiration realized by government program, 
with no obligation on the part of the government. 
 
One of the core functions of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) is to investigate 
complaints. The Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia (Commission) has been 
receiving complaints on wide range of issues since it started rendering its quasi-judicial 
functions. Among them, many complaints relating to forced have been brought to its 
attention. The Commission has rejected the bulk of the complaints or referred them to 
either courts of law or and the Ombudsman Institute on the ground they do not involve 
human rights issues (i.e. they are mere administrative matters that do not qualify for its 
inquiry). By the same token, investigation of complaints on forced eviction is an 
exception rather than the norm. Disclaiming jurisdiction might shed light on the 
underlining issues-it might mark fear on the part of the Commission not to confront the 
economic and development policies of the government; or adoption of pre-conceived 
approach to issues of economic, social and cultural rights, or erroneous interpretation of 
its mandate or incapacity to deal with such issues. This paper will deal with the 
Commission’s handling of complaints pertaining to the right to housing in general and 
forced eviction in particular. Some of interesting complaints handled by the Commission 
will be reviewed to see the underlining reasons hampering the Commission from 
examining the essence of specific cases. Some measures to be adopted so that the 
Commission could probe complaints of all sorts and of forced evictions in particular are 
hinted. 
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The source of information for the study is records of the Commission, legal instruments, 
both national and international, and literature. 
 
1. Political Context of and Process in Setting up the Commission  
 
NHRIs usually are set up following constitutional reform and/or chaotic situation ending 
with peace accord
1
. Regarding mode of setting up, they can be established in three ways: 
by constitution (or amendment of constitution), by act of parliament, and by presidential 
decree
2
. The setting up of NHRIs stipulated in constitutional text, which represents the 
most powerful option as it guarantees the permanence of the institutions, is found in 
countries that have recently undergone constitutional reforms and marked by grave 
human rights violations in the past
3
.   
 
Coming to Ethiopia, the evolution of the discourse on democracy, human rights, and 
democratic institutions in the country took place at a time of significant legal and political 
change. After a protracted armed struggle, the current ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted the former military regime from power 
in 1991, at the time that coincided with the fall of the Socialist Camp and the resulting 
wave of democratization. Issues of democratic governance, human rights, rule of laws, 
and decentralization emerged as central ones after the demise of the military regime
4
. The 
then transitional government undertook major transformative measures overhauling the 
political landscape, orientation, civil service, and economic policy of the nation aimed at 
redressing past injustices, atrocities and dire economic conditions amid high public 
expectations to usher in new era
5
.    
 
Faced with the lofty task of creating a foundation for democratic system, those involved 
in crafting a new constitution looked to providing a rights-based constitution anchored in 
the rule of law and limited government. A set of provisions with human rights orientation 
was believed to play a central role in this regard. This explicates the due regard the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution) 
bestows to fundamental rights and freedoms
6
. 
                                                 
1
 B. Lindsnaes and L. Lindholt, ‘National Human Rights Institutions-Standard Setting and Achievements’, 
in B. Lindsnaes, L. Lindholt and C. Yigen,  eds., National Human Rights Institutions: Articles and Working 
Papers, the Danish Centre for Human Rights, 2001, pp. 14-15; see Rachel Murray, ‘The Role of NHRIs at 
the International and Regional Levels: The Experience of Africa’, Human Rights Law in Perspective, Vol. 
11,  Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 3; see also International Council on Human Rights 
Policy, Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions, Versoix, Switzerland, 2000, pp. 
58-62(hereinafter referred to as ‘International Council on Human Rights Policy’) 
2
 Lindsnaes and Lindholt, op.cit. 
3
 Ibid, pp. 14-15 
4
 Mohammed Abdo, ‘The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: Challenges Confronting Its Effective 
Functioning’, Chinese Year Book of Human Rights, Vol. 4, 2006, pp. 27-28 
5
 The measures undertaken include, inter alia, political pluralism as opposed to one party system, the 
framing of new constitution with liberal features, inception of federal arrangement and decentralization 
based on ethno-linguistic factors, structural adjustment, and adoption of market-oriented economic policy. 
6
 The ‘Preamble’ of the Constitution declares that its objective is to build a political community based on 
the rule of law for the purpose of ensuring lasting peace and guaranteeing a democratic order. Protection of 
human right and fundamental freedoms is a key to achieve this commitment. At least a third of 106 
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Appreciating that the existing courts cannot alone shoulder the protection of human 
rights, the framers of the Constitution agreed on the need for democratic institutions that 
would advance democratic governance
7
.  The Commission was thus created as one of the 
rights-protective mechanisms as a response to a history of authoritarian rule in general 
and a notorious military dictatorship in particular that caused immense carnage
8
. Its root 
in the Constitution lends it public legitimacy as the Constitution was drafted and adopted 
following wider public participation. Subject only to the Constitution and the law, it acts 
as a safeguard against the abuse of state power and to ensure that human rights are 
upheld. While a constitutional foundation does not ipso facto guarantee its better 
functioning, it provides a more secure basis than an executive decree or order, which is 
prone to change easily. 
 
It was largely domestic impulse that sparked off the need for democratic institutions 
during the transition period. Increased international factors also opened room for 
conditions favouring human rights regime in general and democratic institutions in 
particular in the new democratic process set in motion in the same period. Arguably, the 
global upsurge in the number of NHRIs, dating back to the early 1990s, has thus affected 
Ethiopia as well
9
. Because issues of human rights entered Ethiopian political vocabulary 
in part through external influences at the time of transition
10
.  It is suffice to mention the 
policy impact of the USA, which emerged as a major supporter and donor of the 
incumbent party following the collapse of the former regime.  In the mid 1991, the Bush 
(Sr.) Administration adopted a new policy toward Africa, which judges governments by 
their stability and effective governance in order to secure U.S.A.'s economic assistance
11
. 
This American policy, which centred on democracy and human rights, found one of its 
first applications in Ethiopia
12
.  
 
A myriad of international factors propelling the wave of establishment of NHRIs in the 
early 1990s is not unique to Ethiopia. Koo and Ramier have offered an insightful 
                                                                                                                                                 
Provisions of the FDRE Constitution are on human rights. Its Chapter Three contains a Bill of Rights. 
Article 13(1) makes it incumbent on all government organs at all level to respect and enforce the 
Constitution.    
7
 Sub-articles 14 and 15 of Article 55 of the FDRE Constitution stipulate the establishment of the Human 
Rights Commission and the Ombudsman Institute respectively. The setting up of the Auditor General and 
the National Election Board are envisaged under Articles 101 and 102 of the Constitution respectively. 
8
 This is implicit from and reflected in the document prepared, in Amharic, by the Legal Standing 
Committee of the House of People’s Representatives to elaborate draft laws to establish the Commission 
and the Ombudsman, 1999, p. 1 
9
 Abdo, supra note 4,  op. cit., p.  24 
10
The post Cold-War attachment of provision of financial and technical support of donor governments to 
human rights issues, the active role of the UN in promoting the idea of establishment NHRIs and the wave 
of democratization engulfing countries in transition following the collapse of the former USSR in early 
1990s have also contributed, to some extent, towards considering the establishment of the democratic 
institutions in the new political and constitutional order set in motion in Ethiopia in the early 1990s. See 
Claude E. Welch, Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-Governmental 
Organizations, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995, p. 11.  
11
 Ibid, p. 12 
12
 Ibid 
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theoretical perspective as to how international factors underpin the growing establishment 
of NHRIs in different pats of the world since 1990s
13
.  
 
Compared to other legislation, the process of enacting the enabling statute of the 
Commission and the Ombudsman Institute is unprecedented considering a wide range of 
public and expert participation amid heightened public expectation
14
. Specifically, it 
involved an input of international experts and practitioners of NHRIs, public discussion 
throughout the country on draft legislation and workshop of local experts on it
15
.  
Drawing on this, Parliament eventually enacted the enabling legislation of the 
Commission, Proclamation No. 210/2000, in 2000(Proclamation). However, the 
nomination of Chief Commissioner took place only in July 2004 and of the other two 
Commissioners a year later. The delay in the enactment of the legislation and 
appointment of officials was attributed to the Ethio-Eritrean War (1998-2000) that 
diverted the attention of the government to issues of maintaining national security
16
. On 
top of the war, the process was stalled by political and bureaucratic procedures
17
. 
 
Although the Commission’s enabling legislation involved a broad-based consultation of 
the general public and experts, both local and international human rights NGOs were 
excluded from the consultation, triggering criticism
18
. Despite this, the setting up of the 
Commission was accepted as important development in attempts to promote and protect 
                                                 
13
 SeeJeong-Woo Koo and Francisco O, Ramirez, ‘National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: 
Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966-2004’, Social Forces, Vol. 87, No. 
3, 2009 
14
 Ethiopia chose to have two separate institutions-one for administrative oversight and the other for human 
rights issues. Gravity of both human rights abuses and administrative malpractices along with the sheer size 
of the country are among the major rationale for setting up two distinct institutions. This is inferred from 
the document prepared by Parliament to elaborate the enabling statutes of the two institutions indicate this 
impliedly. See supra note 8, op. cit., p. 1 
15
 The Government arranged an international conference in 1997 that managed to bring together about 68 
well-known experts, jurists, and activists, officials of national human rights institutions of many states and 
other officials and representatives. The Conference was organized with a view to drawing on the 
experience elsewhere as the national democratic institutions were a new phenomenon in Ethiopia. The 
Conference and the deliberations on papers presented therein contributed significantly to the concept paper 
developed by parliament for the public discussions in order to eventually draft legislation for the two 
institutions. The concept paper contains options to be chosen by the public after public discussion regarding 
issues such as the structure, mandate, operational powers, leadership, and accessibility of the Commission. 
National discussions on the concept paper were held at the capital cities of the nine units of the Federation, 
as well as Addis Ababa and Ambo. Ethiopian experts made deliberations on the outcome of the discussion 
held on the concept paper and the choice made by the public regarding the would-be normative content of 
the legislation. They submitted their findings to the parliament. Building on this, the parliament made a 
draft Act and presented it to the public deliberation. See Abdo, supra note 4, op. cit., p. 27; See also 
Mohammed Abdo, ‘Challenges Facing the New Ethiopian Ombudsman Institution’, International 
Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol. 6, 2002, p. 78; see also supra note 8, op. cit., pp. 1-2 
16Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, ‘Strategic Plan for the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 
2006-2011’, the Office of the Team of International Consultants and the Justice for All and Prison 
Fellowship Ethiopia, 2006, p. 47 
17
 World Bank, Ethiopia: Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment, 2004, p. 32 
18
 The Human Rights Watch criticized the exclusion of local and international NGOs from the whole 
process and described the act as a worrying matter from the early inception of the Commission. See  
Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders?:Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, 2001, 
p. 60 
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human rights within the nation. It can thus be regarded as willingness on the part of the 
government to change complex human rights situation in the country
19
. Because an 
apparent lack of appropriate social and political action and determination to condemn and 
sanction social norms abusive of human rights have been of concern in the country for a 
long time
20
.  
 
Upon its establishment, there was high expectation of what the Commission would offer. 
This is unsurprising in a nation where the immense violation of dignity of citizens at the 
hands of the brutal military junta was still fresh in the memory of millions of people.  
 
2. Structure and Composition of the Commission 
 
Both a statutory and constitutional body, the Commission is an independent autonomous 
institution accountable to Parliament (the House of People’s Representatives). Compared 
to NHRIs elsewhere, it is relatively a small Commission, composed of a Chief 
Commissioner, a Deputy Chief Commissioner and a Commissioner for Children and 
Women, and other commissioners as may be deemed necessary, and the necessary 
personnel
21
. Its small size would ensure, under normal assumption, a more efficient 
decision-making process but at the expense of pluralism of its composition in the face of 
ethnic and religious diversity in the country. A larger one would have promoted pluralism 
at the cost of resources and decision-making process. The drafters of the enabling 
legislation seem to have given much weight to the financial and human resource 
constraints and opted for a smaller one
22
. Given the large number of ethnic groups in the 
country, coupled with limited posts for officials, one may not obviously expect the 
Commission to replicate such diversity at a time.  
 
The Commission’s head office, the only office that operated since establishment up to 
2011, is located in the capital, Addis Ababa. Increasing its outreach, the Commission, in 
2011, set up branch offices in different parts of the country, with most of them in the 
Capital cities of different States
23
. Apart from advancing the promotion and protection of 
human rights at the local level, the decentralization has enhanced the Commission’s staff 
diversity and pluralism as local staff and local vernaculars are used to conduct their 
                                                 
19
 Sarah Vaughan and Kjelit Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, 
SIDA Studies No. 10, 2005, p. 57 
20
 Ibid 
21
The Australian Human Rights Commission has 6 commissioners, including the President. The South 
African Human Rights Commission has at least five Commissioners. Compared to its size and population, 
Ghana is a small country by the Ghanaian Human Rights and Administrative Justice Commission has three 
Commissioners. 
22
 The Concept paper prepared by Parliament for discussion on the would-be content of draft legislation for 
the Commission as well as the Ombudsman, hints out this fact. See Supra note 8, op. cit., pp. 1-4 
23
Hawassa, Bahr Dar, Mekele, Gambella and Jijiga  another town, Jimma are where the branch offices were 
set up in 2011. Parliament approved the proposed establishment of these branch offices in December 2010.  
Seven more branch offices will be established in the fiscal year 2011/2012. See Ethiopian Human Rights 
Commission, Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 05, 2011, p. 2. The decision to set up branch offices supports the view 
that the Commission is not under the instruction of Parliament as to how to go about doing so. The 
initiative to set the branches was made by the Commission itself and prior discussion with Parliament made 
it possible for securing funding for branch offices. 
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respective activities
24
. While regional offices mean better access, physical access remains 
a barrier for much of the rural population.  
 
The Proclamation provides a number of rules guaranteeing the institutional independence 
of the Commission in terms of allocation of funding, and appointment and dismissal of 
and immunity to its officials
25
. Other guarantees of independence in the form of its 
authority to recruit, and employ staff and to adopt working rules and procedures are 
provided under the legislation
26
.  
 
Generally, the Proclamation meets, at least theoretically, the requirement of the Paris 
Principles regarding the independence of NHRIs. The issue is, however, whether the 
officials appointed to run the institution are, in practice, truly independent of party 
politics and the executive while discharging their functions. This is significant given the 
fact that the country did not, to a large extent, have institutions that were and are capable 
of functioning independently of the government of the day
27
. That apparently is why 
scepticism was raised, at the very inception of the Commission, as regards the 
independence of the first officials that assumed office
28
. The closed and non-inclusive 
nature of the selection process, and concerns over the human rights competence of some 
of those appointed could be raised as grounds that would likely undermine the full 
independence of the institution from the very outset
29
. The lack of transparency in the 
nomination process and doubt as regards the Commissioners’ competence and 
independence partly stems from the enabling legislation itself and also from the political 
tradition in the country to some extent. 
 
                                                 
24
 Training activities used to be handled by the Head Office is nowadays run by the branch offices and 
complaints are also being entertained by the same. See the UNDP, Democratic Institutions Program, 
Annual Report, 2011, p. 18 
25
 It provides that the budget of the Commission is to be drawn and submitted to the parliament by itself 
(Article 19(2)). The executive agencies do not have a say in this regard, which helps to avoid financial 
manipulation by them and secures the independence of the institution. To ensure the independent 
appointment of officials, the law sets up an independent Committee, the ‘Nomination Committee’(Article 
11 of the Proclamation). 
26
 Article 35 of the enabling act of the Commission provides that the Commissioners may not be held 
civilly or criminally liable for any act done or omitted, observations made or opinions issued, in good faith 
and in the exercise of their functions. This immunity protects the independence of the members to carry out 
their functions without fear of prosecution. Article 19 of the legislation also indicates that institution is 
entitled to hire its staff and come up with its operational rules and procedures. 
27
 Abdo, supra note 4, op. cit., p. 34 
28The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights, ‘Ethiopia: Human Rights Defenders under Pressure: 
Report: International Fact-Finding Mission’, 2005, p. 18 
29
 The absence of clear set of procedures on short-listing candidates and lack of meaningful public 
consultation on nominees characterize the selection of the first batch of Commissioners. It was not clear as 
to how they were selected from among the proposed candidates. The first and former Chief Commissioner, 
Dr. Kassa Gebrehiwhot, was a diplomat with a background in literature studies. The former Deputy 
Commissioner, Demoze Mame, was a lawyer by profession who once served as President of the Supreme 
Court of Oromia National Regional State and also assumed senior post within the executive body in the 
same State. The Commissioner for Women and Children, Yeshareg Damte, also assumed senior post within 
the South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State and educated in sociology. 
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To ensure the independent appointment of officials, the law sets up an independent 
Committee, the ‘Nomination Committee’, the composition of which does not, strictly 
speaking, include NGOs or civil society proper
30
. In fact, the enabling law does not 
stipulate any fundamental procedure on working method of the ‘Nominating Committee’, 
making it an obscure body. In practice, it invites the general public to submit suitable 
candidates they think qualify to run the institution. However, the actual process of 
recruiting officials is not open and participatory. Put it differently, the Committee does 
not allow the public in general and the civil society in particular to debate on the list of 
nominees either, carrying out the nomination behind closed doors. Moreover, no 
interview is conducted with the would-be officials of the institution. 
 
Unlike in other jurisdictions, the enabling state does not require proposed commissioners 
to have legal training or human rights expertise as a compulsory precondition to assume 
office. It makes legal background an optional prerequisite and leaves out human rights 
expertise altogether although a would-be nominee is supposed to defend human rights
31
. 
 
Taking the existing procedure and practice as backdrop, the appointment of party 
members or affiliates is inevitable in a country where the government of the day controls 
all the institutions. Especially, the appointment of the Chief Commissioner, who usually 
leads the Commission, may ultimately depend on the will of the political party in 
power
32
. Be that as it may, the most important thing is whether they are independent in 
their actual work. It is important to note that although all the Commissioners are 
appointed by Parliament, it is only the Chief Commissioner who is directly accountable 
to Parliament
33
.  
 
Although apparently in full compliance with the Paris Principles, the Commission is not 
accredited as yet. Its attempt to get accredited commenced in 2010. It was supposed to 
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 It includes four members from each faith group ( Islam, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic), Speakers of 
the two Chambers of Parliament(the House of Federation and the House of People’s Representatives), 
seven members from the House of People’s Representatives, the President of the Federal Supreme Court, 
and two members from among opposition parties that have seats in Parliament. It is not clear how the 
opposition group is represented in the last nomination of the Commissioners as there is only one seat of the 
opposition party in Parliament. The ruling party won 99.6 of the seats, losing only two seats of a 547- 
member House( one seat went to the opposition party and the other to an independent candidate who 
openly affiliates himself to the policies of the ruling party). 
31
 Article 12(3) of the Proclamation. Article 12(2) indicates that a proposed candidate must be one who 
upholds human rights (Article 12(2). The Amharic version seems to suggest that he/she must be one who is 
concerned for human rights causes but whether this incorporates human rights expertise is not clear. 
32
 Two of the incumbent officials were actually members of the ruling party made of a coalition of four 
parties- one is from Tigray People’s Liberation Front(Berhane Woldekiros, Deputy Chief Commissioner), 
and the other from Amhara People’s Democratic Party(Asmaru Berhanu, Commissioner for Women and 
Children), enough to doubt the true independence of the Commission. Once they assume office, they are 
normally supposed to resign from party. No information is available on their relation with the Party since 
they assumed office.  Although not clearly identified as party member, the Chief Commissioner, Tiruneh 
Zena, is thought to be affiliated to the ruling party. Interview with many experts of the Commission 
underscores this fact. 
33
 The other Commissioners are accountable to the Chief Commissioner. See Article 13(2) of the 
Proclamation. All commissioners are to be appointed for a fixed term of five years of office, with the 
possibility of one reappointment. See Article 14(2) of the Proclamation 
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submit its application along with requisite documents for accreditation purpose but failed 
to act within a schedule fixed by the International Coordination Committee of National 
Human Rights Institutions (ICC)
34
.  Its second application was scheduled for scrutiny by 
ICC in November 2012 but has been deferred for one year
35
. 
 
3. Mandate and Power of the Commission 
 
NHRIs are usually commissioned to carry out, among others, promotion, information, 
documentation, education, research on human rights, and protection
36
. As provided under 
Article 6 of the Proclamation, the Commission has broad mandate to promote and protect 
human rights. It is mandated to educate the public about human rights with a view to 
raising awareness and fostering the tradition of respect for human rights, to provide 
consultancy service on human rights, and to provide opinion on Government reports 
submitted to international human rights bodies
37
. It also is authorized to investigate, upon 
complaint or suo moto, human rights violations and to propose revision, enactment of 
laws and formulation of policies relating to human rights
38
. In addition, it is empowered 
to ensure that laws, decisions and practices of the government are in harmony with 
human rights enshrined under the Constitution and to also make sure that human rights 
are respected by government as well as other entities
39
.  
 
Although bestowed broad mandate, the Commission’s reach is not without limitation. It 
does not have the power to scrutinize alleged human rights violations pending before the 
House of People’ Representatives, the House of Federation, or courts of law at any 
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 The ICC was set by NHRIs themselves for the accreditation purpose. To facilitate accreditation it set up a 
sub-committee entirely devoted to accreditation. The ICC is not a UN agency; it is rather a global 
association of NHRIs that coordinates the relationship between NHRIs and the UN human rights system. It 
is composed of 16 members from each of four regions, American, Africa, Asia Pacific, and Europe in order 
to ensure fair representation of each region. The ICC liaisons with the UN human rights bodies and 
encourage coordination among institutions. The National Institution Unit under the Office of the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights acts as a permanent secretariat to the ICC and assist it in, 
among others, organizing its meetings and its accreditation process. The ICC generally meets during the 
annual sessions of the Human Rights Council and holds biennial international conferences. The 
accreditation status is reviewed at least every five years. Accreditation increases NHRI’s national and 
international legitimacy and also entitles participation rights in diverse UN forums depending on their 
ranking. 
The Commission’s application for accreditation was supposed to be reviewed by the Sub-Committee on the 
Accreditation in a schedule fixed for accreditation purpose, which was 11-15 October 2010. See the 
schedule of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the International Coordination Committee of National 
Human Rights Institutions, 2009 (Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/nhri/pages/nhrimain.aspx 
35Official date for considering the Commission’s application for accreditation is set for 18-22 November 
2013. See the website of the ICC sub-committee on Accreditation (SAC). 
nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUS/ICCAccreditation/Page/NextSession.aspx.  See also 
nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutAccreditation/Documentss/SCA%20Report%20November%202012%20%28Engl
ish%29.pdf. 
36
 Lindsnaes and Lindholt, in Working Papers and Articles, supra note 1, op. cit., p. 25 
37
 Sub-articles 3, 6 and 7 of Article 6 and Article 19(2)(d) of the Proclamation 
38
 Article 6(4 and 5) of the Proclamation 
39
 Article 6( 1 and 2) of the Proclamation 
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level
40
. Hence, all other government institutions other than the exceptions are not off-
limit to the Commission’s investigation. It is remarkable that the statute subjected the 
military, security, and police forces that are closely associated with human rights abuses 
in the past to its power
41
. In this respect, the Commission is different from the 
Ombudsman in that the latter does not have the power to investigate matters related to 
national security and defence forces
42
. 
 
Apart from government authorities, the Commission’s reach extends to individuals and 
non-state entities. Accompanied by an umbrella clause, which entitles it to perform such 
other functions as it may consider necessary for achieving its functions, the Commission 
thus not only has all the functions the Paris Principles prescribe but also a potentially 
wider mandate
43
. It is an all inclusive institution unlike the case of, for instance, the 
Human Rights Commission of South Africa where some human rights issues are given to 
other entities
44
. The fact that the Ombudsman’s mandate is confined to maladministration 
issues only, making it a prototype of a classical ombudsman, signifies the inclusiveness 
of the Commission’s mandate on human rights issues45.  
 
Such inclusive mandate is advantageous. On top of scarcity of resources, it allows for the 
application of an integrated and consistent human rights approach to different human 
rights issues. In other words, it is cost-effective than dispersing the fiscal resources across 
several new human rights bodies, especially for a poor country like Ethiopia. 
 
4. Investigation and Enforcement Power 
 
NHRIs should be given ample powers in their legal framework at investigatory process, 
at the implementation stage, and in the other roles that the institutions undertake
46
. The 
Commission is empowered to investigate complaints, upon individual complaints or suo 
moto
47
. The rules on filing a complaint to the Commission make it easy for complainants 
to access it as the Commission can be moved to take action by a complainant in person or 
by someone on his/her behalf in any language and format
48
. The simplicity of a rule to 
                                                 
40
 Article 7 of the Proclamation 
41
 Abdo, supra note 4, op. cit., p. 37 
42
 See Article 7 of the Proclamation that set up the Ombudsman Institute, Proclamation No. 211/2000. 
However, in reporting on matters related to national security, the Commission is obliged to take caution 
with a view to not endangering national security and the same applies to secret matters related to the well-
being or to protecting individual lives (Article 39(3). 
43
 Article 6(11) of the Proclamation 
44
 The South African Human Rights Commission’s actual mandate is not as broad as it appears at first 
sight. It is competent to deal with human rights issues as far as they do not fall within the remit of other 
independent democratic institutions. For instance, it is not empowered to deal with issues of gender 
equality and the rights of minorities   as these powers are given to two separate democratic institutions set 
up exclusively for each of such issue. 
45
 It is implicit from Article 6 of the enabling legislation of the Ombudsman Institute that it is a classical 
Ombudsman. See The Ombudsman Institute Establishment Proclamation No. 211/2000. 
46
 UN Professional Training Series No 4, supra note 29, op. cit., p. 13 
47
 See Articles 6 and 24 of the Proclamation 
48
 A Complaint may be instituted by a person who alleges that his/her right is violated or by his/her spouse, 
or family member or representative or a third party(Article 22(1)). The Commission may also receive 
anonymous complaint (Article 22(3)).  A complaint may be lodged, free of charge, in writing, orally or in 
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bring a complaint to the attention of the Commission is meant to supplement the 
formality of procedures that could limit access to courts. 
 
The Commission is given a range of powers to investigate a complaint submitted to it, 
including the investigative power of subpoena, giving it theoretically adequate powers 
necessary for the examination of a complaint
49
. Any person asked to appear for the 
purpose of furnishing information or production of document or record should cooperate 
with the Commission. Failure to act accordingly constitutes offence and punishable by 
sentence and/or fine
50
.  
 
The Commission is, a matter of general rule, supposed to settle complaints through an 
amicable means, seeking an agreement between the parties (Article 26(1). A limited 
number of cases may not be subject to such means
51
.  Emphasis on amicable means of 
settlement reflects the reality regarding dispute resolution in the country. The fact that 
more than 84% of the population lives in rural areas where the traditional system has a 
strong authority on individual as well as communal matters makes the reflection of such 
system in the Commission’s power significant. 
 
As is the case with most NHRIs, the Commission is not authorized to set aside, revoke or 
modify decisions of agencies. Made in an advisor capacity, its recommendations are not 
legally binding. It is not explicitly authorized to initiate court proceedings either in its 
own name or on behalf of an aggrieved party either
52
. However, it is under obligation to 
notify the concerned organs of the crimes or administrative faults committed, if it 
believes that such occurred in due course of or after its investigation
53
.  
 
The enforcement mechanisms it uses to ensure compliance are to publicize, be it in 
annual or special report as may be necessary, and to finally report to the parliament on its 
recommendations in particular and on its overall activities in general
54
. Another 
instrument of enforcement is a criminal sanction. A penalty is prescribed if there is 
failure to apply the recommendations issued by the Commission or if there is failure to 
provide reasons within three months for not applying the recommendation, placing 
person(s) subject to the recommendation of the Commission to behave in some way
55
. 
                                                                                                                                                 
any other means and may be in the working language of the Commission, which is Amharic, or in any other 
language. See Articles 23(1 and 3). 
49
 The Commission is empowered to compel the attendance of witness to give testimony, or force the 
production of evidence by those in possession of them (Article 25 of the Proclamation) 
50
 See Article 41 of the establishment Proclamation. 
51
The Commission’s Complaint Handling Manual is apparently silent on this matter. According to the 
interview with  one of the experts in the investigation department of the Commission such cases include 
allegation of torture, forced disappearance, violence against women(Interview with Terefe Wondimu, 
Senior Investigator, Investigation Directorate, Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia, 15 September 2011, 
Addis Ababa).  
52
 Ibid 
53
 Article 28 of the Proclamation 
54
 Article 39 of the Proclamation 
55
 If a person without good cause fails to comply with a recommendation issued by the Commission or fails 
to offer a reasoned justification for not doing so within three months from receipt of the recommendation, 
he/she commits a criminal offence and is liable to punishment if found guilty. The person could face 
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Serving to strengthen its enforcement powers, such sanction is an incentive to the 
Commission’s autonomy. In addition, it may collaborate with other organs, for instance, 
media and NGOs, to mount pressure on government authorities to heed its opinions. 
 
Actually, all the aforementioned mechanisms are not remedies for recommendation but 
constitute means towards securing the provision of remedies. 
 
The Commission possesses only persuasive powers to issue recommendation or initiate 
negotiation or mediation in order to resolve grievances. While this may, at first glance, 
appear to relegate the Commission to a back-seat role in promoting and protecting human 
rights abuses and also access to it , it might bring with it freedom of movement and action 
in investigation of complaints and promotion of human rights. Particularly, promotional 
work may not be considered, from government point of view, biting and spur them, at 
least, not to interfere with, or to support the work of the Commission’s efforts at best. 
 
5. NHRIs and Forced Evictions 
 
Before reviewing the practice of the Commission in handling forced evictions, it is good 
to make quick remarks on forced evictions under international human rights law. 
 
Forced evictions can be broadly defined as the permanent or temporary removal against 
their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which 
they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other 
protection
56
. Forced evictions occur in both urban and rural areas, each with varying 
justifications. Renewal, demolition of slums, preparation for mega-events (such as major 
sport events) and other ‘for public interest’ reasons are often used to justify forced 
eviction in urban areas
57
. In rural and remote areas, forced evictions could take place 
owing to, among others, large scale development projects (infrastructures, dams, and 
roads), mining, extractive and other industrial activities
58
. Forced eviction can also 
happen in connection with forced population transfers, internal displacement, and forced 
relocations in the context of armed conflict
59
. In all of these contexts, the right to 
adequate housing and not to be subjected to forced eviction may be violated through a 
wide range of acts or omissions attributable to state parties
60
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
imprisonment from three to five years or a fine from 6000-10000 Ethiopian Birr or both. See Article 41(2) 
of the Proclamation. 
56See UN, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement’, presented 
in the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of  the right to adequate 
standard of living,  2007, paragraph 4(hereinafter referred to as ‘UN Basic Principles and Guidelines’); see 
also Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced 
evictions-General Comment 7, 05/20/1997’, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1997, 
paragraph 3(hereinafter referred to as ‘General Comment 7’). 
57
 General Comment 7, op. cit., paragraph 7 
58
 Ibid 
59
 Ibid, paragraph 5 
60
 Ibid  
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In unequivocal terms, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights made it 
clear that all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal 
protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats
61
. It has argued that 
forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the ICESCR
62
. 
Not all evictions are prohibited under international human rights law, however. They can 
be justified in the most exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant 
principles. 
 
Given the interdependence of all human rights, forced evictions frequently violate other 
human rights, including both civil and political rights
63
. The violations may occur when 
two conditions, one substantive and the other procedural, are met. They may occur 
because of the absence of justification/legality for the eviction, and the way the eviction 
is carried out (i.e., the way the evictions are carried out is not compatible with the 
relevant human rights standards
64
.  
 
Forced evictions of individuals and communities from their homes and habitats destroy 
lives and livelihoods. Groups of people that suffer disproportionately from the practice of 
forced evictions include women, children, youth, older persons, and indigenous people, 
ethnic and other minorities
65
. 
 
Quasi and judicial bodies are competent to deal with complaints arising from forced 
evictions. However, a preventive approach to forced evictions is more efficient than 
trying to resolve cases once the process commences. In other words, addressing the legal 
and structural problems that could prevent the recurrence of forced evictions in the first 
place is more important that handling individual complaints. Endowed with power to 
launch investigation by their own initiative and to conduct public inquiry, NHRIs are 
ideally best-positioned to recommend legal and policy measures to be adopted in the 
medium and long run to avert forced evictions.  Their opinions could serve as a basis for 
a dialogue with various stakeholders. Furthermore, using their promotional mandate 
NHRIs could sensitize the general public and government authorities of the need to 
                                                 
61
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Right to Adequate Housing  
(Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant-, General Comment 4, E/1992/23’, Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1991, paragraph 8 
62
 Ibid, paragraph 18 
63
 While manifestly breaching the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, the practice of forced evictions may also 
result in violations of civil and political rights, such as the right to life, the right to security of the person, 
the right to non-interference with privacy, family and home and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions. See UN Basic Principles and Guidelines’, supra note 56, op. cit., Paragraph 6; see also General 
Comment 7, supra note 56, op., cit., paragraph 4 
64
 See General Comment 7, op. cit., paragraphs 13-15. The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines provide 
basic principles governing forced evictions and only sanction them under “exceptional circumstances.  
Some basic principles include: Some basic principles that need to be met include: i) valid justification for 
the project and no other possible alternatives to the eviction; ii) consultation and participation of affected 
people and communities; iii) adequate notification, due process, effective and legal recourse; iv) prohibition 
of actions resulting in homelessness or deterioration of the housing and living conditions, and v) provisions 
of adequate relocation and/or adequate compensation before evictions are carried out. See the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines’, supra note, op. cit , paragraph  6 
65
 See General Comment 7, op. cit., paragraph 10 
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attend to the right to adequate housing in general and the protection against forced 
evictions specifically. 
 
6. The Commission and Forced Evictions 
 
While the Commission is said to be fully operational in 2005, it started exercising its 
quasi-judicial function of investigating complaints in 2006. There is a steady growth in 
the number of cases submitted to the Commission over the years following the 
Commission’s promotion campaigns to raise awareness about itself and human rights66. 
However, the total number of files of complaints submitted to the Commission since its 
inception, which exceeds a little over 4500, is rather small given the sheer size of the 
country and its poor human rights records
67
. At the outset, it is important to note that the 
exact number of complaints submitted to the Commission in general is difficult to come 
by. This is largely attributable to the poor file management and recording of cases prior to 
2010, before the Commission reformed its business process. The reform, launched in 
2009 and completed in 2010, culminated in changing its organizational structure. It 
resulted in, among others, rearranging the original departments and also created new 
sections and posts, one of which is the Registrar at the Investigation Directorate
68
. One 
can observe an improvement in the delivery of services in general and file management in 
particular after the Registrar went operational
69
. 
 
The recent statistics indicates a marked increase in the number of cases submitted to the 
Commission. More than 1427 complaints submitted to the Commission in 2012/2013 
represent an even greater increase over the 65 cases received in its first year of 
operation
70
. 
 
Broadly catalogued, the types of cases submitted to the Commission since it commenced 
discharging its functions are over issues of employment-related matters, interpersonal 
land disputes, property, security of person, freedom of movement, equality and non-
                                                 
66
 The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Inaugural Report, 2011, p. 91(hereinafter referred to as 
‘Inaugural Report Inaugural Report’); see also the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 
2009/2010, pp. 14-15(hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual Report 2009/2010’). 
67
Ethiopia is a vast country with over 85 million people. The poor human rights records of the country is 
well-documented by human rights NGOs, both local and international. Reports issued by, among others, 
the US State Department, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Council attest to this fact. Based on its own documents, the Commission received a little over 4563 
complaints since its inception. The rather low number of complaints has to do with the sheer size of the 
country accompanied by a lack of branch offices until recently or the inadequacy of promotion works by 
the Commission and/or a lack of awareness regarding the Commission’s function or lack of interest in the 
Commission as it lacks executive powers. Among others, a sustained promotion by the Commission about 
itself and the newly opened branches offices and the likely increase in the number of such offices in the 
near future will possibly increase the number of complaints coming to the Commission.  
68
 Owing to the lack of Registrar prior to April 2010 cases end up in the hands of individual investigators as 
there was no practice of a centralized system of recording and admitting cases. See Inaugural Report, supra 
note 66, op. cit., pp. 55-56 
69
 See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2010/2011, p. 8(hereinafter referred to as 
‘Annual Report 2010/2011’). 
70
 See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2012/2013(hereinafter referred to as 
‘Annual Report 2012/2013).  
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discrimination, condition of detention in prisons and police stations, inter-ethnic 
conflicts, election-related issues,  and forced eviction from land and house
71
. 
 
In terms of their number, forced eviction-related complaints feature high among 
complaints that keep on appearing before the Commission annually. Broadly put, they 
relate to arbitrary eviction from house and/or land without prior notice and consultation, 
or without prior arrangement to relocate or provide them compensation. Most of the 
forced evictions were carried out for the purpose of making way to undertake 
infrastructure development (road construction and real estate) and for commercial 
farming. The complaints were mostly made against government authorities. In few cases, 
they were related to rental terms and conditions and complaints were lodged against 
private individuals or entities. For instance, a tenant who could not afford rent increment 
by landlord was forced out of house. He filed a complaint arguing that the action of the 
landlord leading to the loss of shelter constitutes violation of the right to housing. He was 
directed to the Ombudsman. 
 
The investigation of complaints on forced eviction is an exception rather than the norm. 
The Commission managed to investigate few complaints on forced eviction, referring the 
greater part of them to the Ombudsman and a few to courts of law. Those investigated 
relate to the ones in the context of civil strife involving communal or ethnic violence. 
 
6.1. Investigation of Individual and Group Complaints over Forced 
Evictions in Urban Areas 
 
The Commission has been receiving complaints involving the right to adequate housing 
and issues of forced eviction. One important case filed to the Commission that could have 
given rise to important human rights issues in general and government policy on housing 
matters in particular is worth mentioning. The case is over forced eviction from and final 
demolition of houses built without permit.  Sadly, the Commission rejected the case on 
the ground that it lacks jurisdiction over such matter. It is good to have some background 
on the case to shed light on how it could have given rise to human rights issue related to 
the right to housing in general and forced evictions particularly, and the obligation of the 
State in this regard.  
 
Land is a scare resource in urban areas, especially around Addis Ababa owing to rapid 
urbanization. Problems of land-management and bureaucratic hurdles making the 
provision of land to ordinary citizen difficult, the souring cost of renting, the unbearable 
cost of the available land along with the failure of the successive governments to address 
the longstanding housing problems in urban areas have forced citizens to get a roof over 
their head by means of their choice
72
. It thus forced citizen to engage in the construction 
                                                 
71
 Inaugural Report, supra note 66, op. cit., 89-96; Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 
2011/2012, p. 22(hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual Report 2011/2012); see also Ethiopian Human Rights 
Commission, A Consolidated Five Year Report, 20011, p. 36(hereinafter referred to as ‘Consolidated Five 
Year Report’). 
72
 Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher, Livelihood and Urban Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia: Perspectives from 
Small and Big Towns, Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(OSSREA), 2010, p. 14 
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of houses without permit, known locally as ‘Chereka Bet’, which has become a recurrent 
problem in big cities, especially Addis Ababa. The Government has been cracking down 
on such activities, which gained momentum following its ambitious quest to make land 
available for, inter alia, industries, real estate, and for construction of government-
financed houses. 
 
Mindful of the cause of construction without permit and housing problems in urban areas, 
the government has recently been trying to address the problem through, among others, 
engaging in massive construction of houses, especially for low-income citizens, to 
alleviate their chronic shortages. Despite this, the problem still persists.  
 
Forced-eviction is aggravated following change in policy of the incumbent ruling party. 
Putting rural development as its core economic development policy, the party in power 
did not have urban development policy for more than a decade since it assumed power in 
1991. The adoption of its Urban Policy in 2003 followed by sustained economic growth 
and expansion of business activities led to a face-lift of many big cities in the country, 
especially Addis Ababa. The expansion of different business activities lead to scramble 
for land acquisition, spurring massive increase it its price and exacerbating the pending 
availability problem. 
 
One of the means to alleviate chronic shortage of housing is the introduction of urban 
renewal, which calls for demolition of slums in different parts of Addis Ababa, affecting 
many poor communities living in them. Of course many of the poor communities were 
relocated to low-cost houses (called locally ‘Condominium’). The transfer has not only 
affected their livelihood but also their social bonds. It affected the petty commerce they 
used to engage in, subjected them to transportation difficulties and their long-established 
social schemes such as Idir and Iqub. The eviction thus puts not only the right to housing 
at stake but also the right to property, livelihood, and cultural issues. 
 
The Case could have given the chance to the Commission to see the obligation of the 
state in relation to housing rights and forced evictions, and policy and administrative 
measures undertaken by it to address the problem. The FDRE does not guarantee the 
right to housing per se in explicit terms. However, it is incumbent upon the government 
to allocate resources to give social services including education and health (Article 41(3). 
The social service referred to here could include housing as the provision is not meant to 
be exhaustive.  One of the ‘National Policy Principles’ obliges the state to adopt policies 
and measures so long as resources permit, to provide social service to citizens, including 
housing (Article 90(1). Furthermore, as Ethiopia is a state party to the ICESCR, the 
Commission could have ample justifications to look at the case and its policy and 
administrative implications to the obligations of the state in this regard. At least, it would, 
as a face-saving measure, have been better for the Commission to refer the matter to the 
Ombudsman than to reject it since administrative decision was involved in carrying out 
the action. 
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Admittedly, while forced eviction from land occupied and constructed carried out without 
permit is justifiable, subject to conditions, the Commission failed to examine whether the 
case at hand falls under such instances.  
 
In connection with forced eviction some complaints could also have provoked issues of 
adequate standard of living and the right to adequate housing. A complaint, filed by a 
group of 19 complainants, was over houses given to them as replacement for their 
demolished ones. They alleged that the new houses do not have basic amenities, such as 
toilet and water, falling short in standard to the ones they used to live in. In another more 
or less similar complaint, applicants alleged that new houses given to them do not meet 
necessary standard, are smaller in size than they used to live in and far from shopping 
areas, forcing them to incur unexpected and unbearable expenses. The Commission 
preferred to provide advice in both cases instead of investigating the matter while these 
cases were essentially on the right to adequate standard of living and to adequate housing. 
 
6.2. Investigation of Communal or Ethnic Violence Causing Forced 
Evictions 
 
Many instances of forced evictions are associated with violence, such as evictions 
resulting international armed conflicts, internal strife and communal or ethnic violence
73
. 
The Commission has investigated alleged human rights abuses arising from communal 
violence in different parts of the country. Investigation of such issues is the hallmark of 
the Commission’s quasi-judicial function. The Commission is quick to dispatch its ad hoc 
Committee to deal with such matters and issue recommendations. This is probably 
because abuses arising from violent communal conflict may not directly implicate 
government authorities and its agents. The Commission has invested its energy in 
investigating private matters and non-state entities in areas such as labour and conflict 
rather than abuses attributable to government authorities and their agents
74
. 
 
To mention just one, a communal violence giving rise to multiple claims of human rights 
abuse, including forced evictions, occurred in the Southern part of the country. 
 
In an ethnic conflict that flared up in the southern part of the Country, the Commission 
launched an investigation, following the submission to it of a complaint, to determine 
whether human rights violations had actually occurred and to recommend an appropriate 
legal and professional advice to resolve the problem
75
. The complaint submitted by a 
group of people purporting to act on behalf of Guji ethnic groups alleged that fellow 
members of their ethnic group were subject to a consistent torture, forced disappearance, 
death, detention, eviction from their house and land, and destruction of their livelihood 
since referendum was held in the area to decide whether to put the area within the South 
                                                 
73
 See General Comment 7, supra note 56, op. cit., paragraph 6 
74
 Mohammed Abdo, ‘National Human Rights Institution and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An 
Examination of the Mandate and Practice of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission’, in Eva Brems, 
Gauthier de Beco and Wouter Vandenhole eds., National Human Rights Institutions and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, 2013, p. 144 
75
 See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission,  ‘Report on the Investigation of Human Rights Violation 
Complaints in  Wondogenet Area, Sidam Zone, South Regional State’, March 211, pp 1 - 2 
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Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State or Oromia National Regional State76.  
They alleged that in the latest violent attacks against them by the Sidama ethnic group, 
some people were killed and others disappeared, many houses were set ablaze, some 
household animals were looted and killed, and farms were set on fire for the sole reason 
that they happen to be ethnic Guji living among the Sidamas. They added that the local 
administration dominated by the Sidamas was complicit in the attacks targeting them. 
 
The Commission did not however find that there was a deliberate and systemic policy to 
discriminate and attack the Guji community that was put in place by the local 
administration dominated by the Sidamas
77
. However, it found out that security forces 
failed to take adequate measures before a full-fledged violence erupted, which could have 
averted the crisis
78
. It finally recommended measures to be adopted to solve inter-ethnic 
conflicts in the area
79
.  
 
To bring down forced evictions in the area, the Commission, in its specific 
recommendation, said that a combination of administrative, political and traditional 
mechanisms had to be deployed to address the root cause of the conflict so that lasting 
peace may prevail in the area
80
. It also called upon the local administration to reinforce it 
endeavour to repair damaged house and/ or to rebuild houses burnt down
81
. 
 
The recommendation is remarkable in that it used strong words against the police and 
security forces, blaming them for not acting prudently to avert the crisis in the first place 
and also in calling for the usage of traditional means in conjunction with formal laws in 
dealing with the root cause of the problem. 
 
6.3. Monitoring and Investigating Complaints in the Context of 
Development Policy-Grand Failure of the Commission 
 
Before examining complaints indicating the fiasco of the Commission to face up to 
challenging government policies impinging on human rights, it is important to offer a 
hasty view of the recent economic and development policies in force. 
 
Despite making impressive economic growth in the last couple of years, Ethiopia remains 
one of the poorest nations in the world. Food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition are 
traits associated Ethiopia, continuing to plague the lives of a considerable portion of its 
population. Ensuring food security in order to tackle deaths stemming from hunger as 
well as malnourishment should inevitably be the key development and economic policies 
                                                 
76
 Some areas inhabited by Guji were put in within Oromia National Regional State and some areas where 
Guji are the minority were put under the administration of the South Regional State. 
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 See the report on the investigation, supra note 104, op. cit., p. 21 
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80
 Ibid, p. 18 
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 Ibid, pp. 22 
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of the government. Safety-net program, promotion of small-scale irrigation scheme by 
local farmers and attracting foreign direct investment in commercial farming, and 
resettlement of population are some of the major long-term development policies adopted 
by the incumbent government to ensure food security and food productivity. 
 
To reinforce its development endeavour aimed at, among others, economic growth in 
general and to securing food security in particular, the government has given an 
ideological clout to it. The notion of ‘developmental state’ has thus gained a growing 
traction in the political discourse and vernacular of the ruling party, particularly since the 
debacle of the 2005 general election, which plunged the country in political turmoil
82
. To 
put the notion in concrete economic policy and plan, the government came up with the 
‘Growth and Transformation Plan’ in 2011. No matter it mentions public participation, 
transparency and good governance, the Plan seems to favour needs-based approach to 
development issues rather than a rights-based approach
83
. Because the term development 
is linked almost exclusively to economic targets (i.e., the growth of GDP), it glosses over 
critical issues such as human rights, democratic participation by civil society and groups, 
and the protection of local populations. 
 
Among the government development policies, foreign investment in agriculture and 
resettlement program account for the bulk of forced evictions in rural areas. 
 
Regarding foreign investment, Ethiopia is often cited as one of the countries where ‘land-
grabbing’ is occurring. It has been handing out huge tracts of land to foreign investors 
drawn from different countries, including India, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti. The bulk of 
fertile land transferred to investors is situated in less populated areas in low-land part, 
including Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz Regions where much of the remaining 
intact forest in the country is situated. In many instances, local communities were driven 
out of their ancestral land to give way to commercial farming allegedly without prior 
consultation with the affected communities and/or inadequate compensation.  
 
The recent resentment program has focused on four Regional States, namely Somali, 
Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella. As the heart of the program is to settle people 
in selected core areas so that better education, health, water and other facilities can be 
made available to a sizeable population. It entails the eviction of people from the area 
they inhabit and restrict them to newly formed villages. Admittedly, it is largely a 
voluntary and participatory exercise. However, some suggest that these conditions were 
undermined by requirements to fulfil quotas for the program
84
.  
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Looked at from a human rights perspective, issues of participation, transparency, 
accountability and effective access to remedies are to be given attention in the 
implementation of any government development policies in general and during forced 
evictions in particular. Investigating and monitoring whether the transfer of land to 
foreign investors and resettlement programs are implemented in ways not trampling on 
human rights of citizens are within the ambit of the Commission. Unfortunately the 
Commission, as an independent institution, could not discharge its functions in this 
regard. It failed to examine individual complaints arising from development policies let 
alone launch inquiry by its own initiative to probe such important human rights issues. 
 
The Commission appears to be more comfortable with the protection of human rights 
where the issues involved do not have political overtones and are politically not 
sensitive
85
. Where issues involved in a complaint have political overtones, the 
Commission tends to avoid them by disclaiming competence to handle them
86
. Two cases 
marking the Commission’s inability to entertain politically sensitive matters confronting 
human rights deserve attention here. 
 
 
The Gambella Case 
 
The Commission rejected, for want of jurisdiction, an interesting complaint filed by a 
representative of people living in a protected forest that could have given rise to 
important human rights issues such as participation, transparency, and provision of 
effective remedies with specific human rights issues including the right to housing, the 
right to work and protection of the environment
87
. The Complaint was instituted by 
Tamiru Ambello, acting on behalf of the community living in the area, to challenge the 
decision of the Gambella National Regional State, which decided to hand the forest area 
over to an investor for the purpose of tea farming
88
. They alleged that they were not 
consulted before the decision was made and also that the clearing of the forest to give 
way to tea farming would have a devastating impact on the environment as well as their 
livelihood based on the forest. Their attempt to get remedy of injunction from the local 
administration and Regional government institutions resulted in vain.  
 
Upon learning that the investor has already cleared a sizeable chunk of the forest, they 
submitted a written request to the President of the country to intervene in the matter and 
help them halt the clearing of the forest. Sympathetic with their case, the President asked 
the Commission to intervene and investigate their complaint. They submitted their 
complaint to the Commission along with the letter of the President and other supporting 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mission to Ethiopia, E/CN.4/2005/47/Add.1, 8 February 2005, p. 15 
85
 Abdo, supra note 74, op. cit., p. 144 
86
 Ibid 
87
 The facts of the complaint and the informal decision to reject the case were narrated by the investigator, 
who wants to remain anonymous, involved in handling the case. I had the privilege to look at the file of the 
complaint, including the documents produced by the complainant and the correspondence between the 
investigator and others. 
88
 The complaint was submitted to the Commission in May 2011. 
 20 
documents. The investigation team at the Commission accepted the case but needed, 
before launching investigation, a professional advice on environmental issues at stake in 
the case and put their request informally to some experts and local organizations working 
on environmental issues such as Pact Ethiopia and Forum for Environment. The experts 
and the organizations asked the investigators to make a formal request, i.e. to produce a 
written letter of the Commission. The leadership of the Commission refused to issue a 
formal letter on the ground that the case does not fall within the purview of the 
Commission and ordered a referral of the case to the Ombudsman Institute, which in its 
turn remanded the case back to the Commission. In the end, both institutions failed to 
deal with the case. 
 
There is no provision that precludes the Commission, and the Ombudsman as well, from 
investigating such complaint as it is not considered by courts and other institutions
89
. The 
Commission’s action contravenes its obligations under the enabling statute to investigate 
any complaint related to human rights violations so long as the matter is not pending 
before other organs. Perhaps, the leadership of the Commission, as well as that of the 
Ombudsman, feels that the issues involved in the case pits them against the policy of the 
government to transfer a large-scale land to investors on the one hand and allegations of 
the so called ‘land-grabbing’ for which the Ethiopian government has been criticized by 
experts and international organizations on the other
90
. The government appears to very 
sensitive on matters of allocation of massive swathes of land to foreign investors. It has 
always been denying allegation that ‘land-grabbing’ has taken place and argues that its 
action is part of its long-term bid for economic development ,  to attract foreign 
investment and technology transfer, to spur employment opportunity, and to help 
eradicate hunger and thereby ensure food self-sufficiency
91
. The Commission seems to 
realize the sensitivities involved in the case and decided not to confront the government 
by investigating the matter, constituting a self-imposed restraint.  
 
The Gura Farda Case 
 
The Commission was tight-lipped over the recent forced eviction of thousands of people 
from the Gurafarda, situated in Southern part of the country. The South Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State decided to evict thousands of people who were 
accused of illegally occupying land without permit, causing deforestation and damaging 
the ecosystem. As a result, many of the victims claimed to have been evicted without 
advance notice and time to even collect their personal belongings let alone agricultural 
produce. Some of them even alleged to have been forcibly loaded onto trucks and buses 
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and dropped in Addis Ababa, from where they were finally sent to the place of their 
origin, situated in some part of the Amhara National Regional State. The action of the 
government caused furry among human rights NGOs, both local and international, and 
the opposition parties operating both locally and abroad, becoming a headline issue for 
some time
92
. Some people go so far as saying the action was part of a systemic attack 
singling out the Amhara people
93
. 
 
During Parliamentary session, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi angrily denied 
accusation that it was a systemic action targeting the Amharas. He argued that it was a 
simple act to deter people from flocking to the area illegally and pointed out that 
settlement from one State to another had to be coordinated between the two States 
involved
94
. Bolstering the argument of the Federal government, the local administration 
pointed out that those evicted were the ones who settled in the area illegally after 2005 
and the ones who arrived before that period had already been given permission to settle
95
. 
 
Some of the victims of the eviction lodged a group complaint to the Commission, 
alleging that the eviction was arbitrary, that they were subjected to violence and lost their 
entire fortune. Apparently fearing the sensitivities involved in the matter, the 
Commission refrained from taking any action on the case. By the same token, the 
Commission also failed to act on individual complaints from some of the victims in the 
case at hand. It opted to refer the matter to the Ombudsman, disclaiming jurisdiction over 
the case. 
 
The rejection of Gambella and Gurafarda cases begs the question of whose interest the 
Commission is serving.  Actually, it negates the very underpinning for the establishment 
of the institution. 
 
Respect for and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of the FDRE constitution. 
The Commission is one of the institutional means to realize this. The basic rationale for 
its establishment is to achieve a permanent shift from the autocratic polities of the past to 
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a just and democratic political arrangement in which the supremacy of law and good 
governance flourishes
96
. The institution is thus meant to serve as the frontline mainstay 
for ensuring that the new status quo does not slide back to the human rights abuses of the 
past by seeing to it that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens remain 
the constant centre of all developmental endeavours being made
97
. Quite contrary to its 
inherent objective, the failure of the Commission to investigate the case means that it 
failed to test whether the development policy of the government is in line with human 
rights ethos espoused by the Constitution. 
 
Whenever the Commission dares to investigate politically sensitive matters, it relies on a 
behind-the-scene approach than its formal powers in the form of naming and shaming. 
Actually, a clandestine mode of engagement with government authorities is the hallmark 
of the Commission’s enforcement mechanism98. Using informal means of 
communication, the Commission has been able to secure remedies for claimants in some 
instances. For instance, concerning forced eviction, the Commission’s intervention, for 
instance, helped to secure remedy to people who were forcibly removed from their 
houses
99. In another case, the Commission’s intervention helped victims to resettle in the 
land from where they were removed to give way to hydropower and irrigation project in 
Tana Beles area
100
.  
 
Actually, such informal engagement is inevitable in authoritarian tradition. Formal 
enforcement mechanisms in the form of naming and shaming does not, as argued by 
commentators, in authoritarian countries with a controlled media and a frail judiciary
101
.  
In such system, informal communication produces far better results that usage of formal 
enforcement powers granted to NHRIs
102
. While informal means help offer remedy in 
individual cases and keep the channel of communication with government open, it 
undermines inherent powers and thereby put the Commission’s credibility at risk. 
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6.4. Systemic Inquiry 
 
The power to initiate suo moto and/or systemic investigation can help NHRIs meet the 
needs of individuals or communities who may not otherwise be heard
103
. Because 
disadvantaged and vulnerable sections of society that are not likely in a position to access 
judicial and quasi judicial bodies. It gives such groups a public voice, making human 
rights violations to become a matter of general knowledge and concern, which is a 
requisite step towards dealing with them
104
.  
 
The Commission is not active in the area of conducting both suo moto investigation and 
systemic inquiry into legal, policy, administrative and institutional issues that give rise to 
recurring human rights problems in the country. The failure to do so is attributed 
predominantly to the Commission’s inability to confront government policies and to lack 
of capacity to some degree. Be that as it may, the Commission conducted limited suo 
moto investigation, most of which relate to the alleged killings of individuals in conflict 
situations and/or in an isolated incident, and orphanage facilities in different parties of the 
country
105
.  
 
Potentially reversing its lack of pro-activism, the Commission plans to conduct inquiry 
into some issues, including issues of large-scale land transfer to investors as well as 
religious conflicts
106
. It appears that a torrent of criticism against the government decision 
to allocate a whopping portion of land to investors has spurred the Commission to plan 
this. In addition, the Commission intends to do so apparently to off-set its failure to 
investigate such matters in a group complaint submitted to it in 2011, for which it was 
fiercely denigrated. Such proposed suo moto investigation is akin to public inquiry, 
although the details of how to go about conducting it is not yet available. Be that as it 
may if the outcome of the study is going to be presented for public discussion, it could 
reshape public view regarding such matter, which in the long-run might shape policy on 
it. 
 
The Commission has not dared to sensitize issues of the right to adequate standard of 
living in general and of forced eviction to the specific despite the practice of forced 
eviction is has become a widespread and recurrent problem, both in urban and rural areas. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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The NHRIs are institutions whose role is to realign State behaviour by constantly 
criticizing the government’s wrongful acts that trample on human rights, offering inside 
perspective to it. By the very nature of their mandate, it is inevitable for NHRIs to be on 
collusion course with the government. If there is no more friction between the institutions 
and their respective governments, such institution is not part of NHRI anymore
107
. It is 
thus vital for the legitimacy of particular NHRI not to yield to pressure, direct or 
indirectly, from a government agency in carrying out its role even if it pits it against the 
government
108
. Indeed, tackling controversial issues even if it brings the institution on 
collision course with the government or its agencies is the public legitimacy litmus test 
for a NHRI
109
.  
Avoiding confrontation with the government, the Commission refused to act on 
complaints alleging important questions of human rights violations, notably on politically 
sensitive issues, by disclaiming jurisdiction. Its failure to handle such matters has 
seriously undermined its standing, giving rise to perception of lack of independence. 
The failure of the Commission to hold the government to account is rooted partly in 
authoritarian political tradition that tightly controls all government institutions and the 
rampant culture of impunity. When authoritarianism is deeply-embedded, the 
accountability mechanisms such tribunals and NHRIs have a limited role in constraining 
government powers.  
Be that as it may, the Commission, as an independent institution, was set up for the 
purpose of protecting human rights. The real test of its independence lies in its ability to 
challenge the government by investigating human rights violations appearing before it. 
The Commission should not thus shy away from probing politically sensitive matters. 
NHRIs need to have clear legal criteria and procedures in place when operating with a 
controversial case, especially in a delicate political and legal environment
110
. In its 
operational procedure, the Commission needs to enunciate clear procedure on 
considering sensitive and high profile cases in order to avoid selectivity in launching 
investigation on matters. No matter crucial policies are involved in government 
development ventures, the obligation to protect implies an active role on the part of the 
state and its institutions to ensure that policies and actions taken to effect government 
programs are carried out in conformity with human rights norms and relevant principles.  
 
As Ethiopia is still at an early stage in the transition towards democracy, there is a need 
for democratic institutions to hold the government accountable. This is significant given 
the fact that human rights abuses, particularly forced evictions, are a recurring problem in 
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the country. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to challenge the government when 
instances for doing so materialize.  
